Phil Bro

Start Here: Examines whether the existence of evil is compatible with an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God.

• Premise 1: If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
• Premise 2: If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
• Premise 3: If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
• Premise 4: If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
• Premise 5: Evil exists.
• Premise 6: If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
• Conclusion: God doesn’t exist.

Explore Examples

Event / Issue	OT References	NT References	Status
The Problem of Evil			Drafted
Divine Hiddeness			Drafted

What Does the Evidence Suggest?

Broad consensus

Summarize conclusions broadly accepted by relevant scholars & describe the dominant interpretation where no clear consensus exists.

Traditional or apologetic position

Present the strongest responsible defense of the passage or claim.

Sources and Further Reading

Topic Resources

1. J. L. Mackie – "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955)

• Type: Journal Paper (Mind, 64(254), pp. 200–212).
• Focus: The Logical Problem of Evil.
• Core Contribution: The modern benchmark for the deductive formulation. Mackie argues that standard theistic claims—God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and evil exists—form a logically contradictory triad. He examines and rejects standard adequate solutions, proposing that an omnipotent being could have created free creatures who always freely choose what is right.

2. Alvin Plantinga – God, Freedom, and Evil (1974) / The Nature of Necessity (1974)

• Type: Book / Monograph (Eerdmans / Oxford University Press).
• Focus: The Free Will Defense.
• Core Contribution: The standard philosophical response to Mackie's logical formulation. Utilizing modal logic and possible-world semantics, Plantinga introduces the concept of Transworld Depravity to argue that it is logically possible that God could not actualize a world containing significantly free creatures who never perform moral evil. This shifted scholarly consensus from the logical problem to inductive/evidential versions.

3. William L. Rowe – "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (1979)

• Type: Journal Paper (American Philosophical Quarterly, 16(4), pp. 335–341).
• Focus: The Direct Evidential / Inductive Argument.
• Core Contribution: Rowe introduces the problem of gratuitous evil using the famous thought experiment of a fawn dying a lingering, agonizing death in a forest fire. He argues that while God might permit evil connected to greater goods, it is reasonable to conclude that instances of intense, unprevented suffering serve no outweighing good, thereby rendering the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, all-good being epistemically improbable.

4. Paul Draper – "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" (1989)

• Type: Journal Paper (Noûs, 23(3), pp. 331–350).
• Focus: The Abductive / Probabilistic Argument (Hypothesis of Indifference).
• Core Contribution: Moving beyond standard theodicies, Draper formulates an argument from inference to the best explanation. He argues that the precise biological distribution of pain and pleasure (specifically how they serve biological survival rather than moral reward/punishment) is significantly more probable on the Hypothesis of Indifference (naturalism) than on classical theism.

5. John Hick – Evil and the God of Love (1966 / 1977)

• Type: Book (Harper & Row / Palgrave Macmillan).
• Focus: Soul-Making Theodicy (Irenaean vs. Augustinian).
• Core Contribution: Hick draws a historical-theological contrast between the "Augustinian" fall-based paradigm and the "Irenaean" developmental paradigm. He posits that humans are created immature, set at an epistemic distance from God in a challenging, law-governed world designed not as a hedonistic paradise, but as an environment suited for moral and spiritual maturation ("soul-making").

6. Stephen J. Wykstra – "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'" (1984)

• Type: Journal Paper (International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 16, pp. 138–160).
• Focus: Skeptical Theism & Epistemic Principles.
• Core Contribution: Wykstra formulates CORNEA (Condition of Re-Reasonable Epistemic Access), arguing that Rowe's inference from "we see no justifying reason" to "there is no justifying reason" is epistemically illicit. Given the cognitive disparity between a finite mind and an infinite creator, humans should not expect to perceive God's reasons for permitting evil.

7. Michael Martin – Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (1990)

• Type: Book (Temple University Press; specifically Chapters 14–17).
• Focus: Comprehensive Inductive Arguments & Deconstruction of Theodicies.
• Core Contribution: Martin systematically delineates direct vs. indirect inductive arguments from evil. His indirect argument posits that the long-standing, recurring failure of all historical and contemporary theodicies provides strong inductive justification that no morally sufficient reason exists for gratuitous natural and moral evil.

8. Peter van Inwagen – The Problem of Evil (2006)

• Type: Book (Oxford University Press / The Gifford Lectures).
• Focus: Global Properties, Vagueness, and Arbitrary Lines.
• Core Contribution: Van Inwagen explores the magnitude, duration, and distribution of evil. He argues that asking "Why didn't God prevent this specific evil?" leads to sorites-like line-drawing paradoxes, contending that any amount of evil permitted in a fallen, nomologically consistent world will necessarily look somewhat arbitrary without disproving divine goodness.